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THE MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENT AFTER UNITED
STATES v. SCOTT. MYTH OR REALITY?
In 1970 a federal district court judge authorized federal narcotics
agents to wiretape a telephone registered to one of nine individuals be-
lieved to be participants in a conspiracy to import and distribute nar-
cotics in the Washington, D.C., area. Seven years later the
admissibility of evidence obtained by that wiretape remained in doubt
as the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Scott' on an
issue portending grave implications for what Mr. Justice Brandeis
called "the right most valued by civilized men"2-- the right to privacy.
The source of the legal battle was a frequently litigated, but seldom
understood, provision of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 19683 that requires government agents monitoring
wiretaps to minimize the interception of conversations that fall outside
the scope of the wiretap order.4 Although the monitoring agents in
1. 434 U.S. 888 (1977). The full case history follows: 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd,
504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, No. 1088-70 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) (unpublished opinion),
rev'd, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976), conviction aj?'d, 551 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.) (mem.), cert. granted, 434
U.S. 888 (1977), aft'd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). These provisions of the Act, which pertain to the use of
electronic surveillance, are commonly referred to as "Title HI."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970) provides in part:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to
intercept. . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of com-
munications not subject to interception under this chapter ....
Literally, § 2518(5) does not impose a duty to minimize on the agents who monitor the wiretap;
rather, the section requires that every wiretap order include a minimization provision. Any "ag-
grieved person," however, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted communication
on the ground that the interception was not made in conformity with the wiretap order, see 18
U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Therefore, inclusion of the minimization directive in the authorization or-
der in effect imposes a duty on monitoring agents to minimize their interceptions of innocent
conversations.
Courts that first interpreted this provision adopted a number of shorthand expressions for its
reference to "communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter." A
number of courts utilized the label "nonpertinent." See, e.g., United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp.
735, 755-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aj'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 932 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. King, 335 F.
Supp. 523, 538 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 920 (1974). Other courts stated that interceptions of "innocent" conversations must be
minimized. See, e.g., United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D. Md. 1972); United States
v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 197 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Whatever the label, "minimization" is the
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Scott knew of the minimization requirement, they made no attempt to
limit their interceptions to those calls related to the narcotics conspir-
acy under investigation. 5 In fact, the agents listened to and tape re-
corded in entirety each of the 384 calls completed over the wiretapped
telephone during the thirty-day surveillance period, even though they
characterized only forty percent of the intercepted calls as narcotics-
related.6
The Supreme Court held, however, that the agents' conduct violated
neither the minimization requirement of Title III nor the fourth
amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.7 In
its first interpretation of the minimization provision,' the Court rea-
soned that the proper standard for assessing compliance with the mini-
mization requirement is an objective evaluation of the agents' conduct
in light of the facts and circumstances at the time of the wiretape with-
process by which law enforcement officials attempt to confine the interception and monitoring of
calls to those described in the authorization order.
5. 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (D.D.C. 1971).
6. Id
7. 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978).
The Supreme Court ordinarily tests the constitutionality of electronic surveillance practices
against the requirements of the fourth amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. Although the protections of the fourth amendment extend to people
rather than places, its coverage generally requires reference to a place. A person is protected
wherever he has a reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, electronic as well as physical intrusion
by the government into a person's privacy may violate the fourth amendment. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967). The seizure of physical property is not required to invoke the protections of the fourth
amendment. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). The seizure of conversations, there-
fore, when it invades a person's reasonable expectations of privacy, comes within the purview of
the fourth amendment. Accord, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471,485 (1963). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
8. The Supreme Court previously had denied certiorari in several cases that raised minimi-
zation issues. See, e.g., United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973); State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972) (construing the
New Jersey electronic surveillance statute's minimization provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-
12 (1971)). Minimization issues were raised, but not confronted by the Court, in United States v.
Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacatedon other grounds,
417 U.S. 903 (1974), and in United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md.), affIdsub nor.
United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aTd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/12
Number 2] MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENT 603
out regard to the agents' subjective intent to minimize their intercep-
tions of innocent conversations.9 Because the agents reasonably could
have believed that each intercepted call contained evidence of criminal
activity, the interceptions were neither unlawful nor unconstitutional. '0
To assess the suitability of the objective reasonableness standard
adopted by the Court for evaluating compliance with Title III's mini-
mization provision, this Note analyzes the constitutional and statutory
origins of the minimization requirement, the evolution of the minimi-
zation doctrine prior to Scott, the Court's holding and reasoning in
Scott, and the decision's impact on the minimization doctrine."
I. THE MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENT: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY ORIGINS
Devising a criminal justice system that strikes a fair balance between
society's need for effective law enforcement and the individual's right
to privacy has long been a source of difficulty for legislatures and
courts alike. 2 As crime control techniques have become increasingly
sophisticated, this difficulty has become increasingly acute, particularly
as technological advances have created a greater potential for the use
and misuse of electronic surveillance.' 3 Although wiretapping may be
9. 436 U.S. at 137-39.
10. Id at 141-43.
11. Although the scope of this Note is limited to the standard by which minimization efforts
should be evaluated, the minimization requirement also raises a number of other issues. See
United States v. Bynum, 423 U.S. 952 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Two of the more important issues concern the definition of "interception" and the remedy for
violations of the minimization requirement. For a treatment of these issues, see Decker & Han-
dler, Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions, and Remedies, 12 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 60
(1975); Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wfiretaps: Minimization, .4mendment,
Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92 (1975); Note, Minimization and the Fourth
Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974); Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guide-
lines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1974); Note, Minimization: In Search of
Standards, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 60 (1973).
12. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
13. Two centuries ago, eavesdropping was a common-law nuisance, described by Blackstone
as "listening under walls or window, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 168
(Lewis ed. 1897). Today, that description hardly seems adequate to reflect the tremendous scien-
tific and technological developments that have made possible the widespread use and abuse of
electronic surveillance. For an excellent treatment of the manner in which technology has revolu-
tionized the art of electronic surveillance, see VanDewerker, State of the Art of Electronic Surveil-
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one of the most effective means of gathering evidence necessary to con-
vict the guilty,'" it simultaneously creates the danger of subjecting all
individuals, guilty or innocent, to undiscernible governmental intrusion
into their lives. 5
Berger v. New York 6 and Katz v. United States7 mark the begin-
nings of the Supreme Court's modem approach to this dilemma.'I In
Berger the Court declared unconstitutional New York's wiretapping
statute 19 because it failed to conform to the "precise and discriminate"
requirements of the fourth amendment2 0 Specifically, the Court noted
that the statute failed to require a showing of probable cause that evi-
dence of a crime would be obtained through the wiretap, to insist upon
a particular description of the conversations to be seized, to place defi-
nite and reasonable time limits on the wiretap's execution, and to de-
lance, in COMMISSION STUDIES, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 141-215 (1976).
Although the term "electronic surveillance" encompasses a broad spectrum of techniques by
which close observation of a person or group may be accomplished from a distance through the
use of electronic devices, Title III governs only the interception of wire or oral communications
without the consent of any one participant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1970). Accordingly, the term
"electronic surveillance" will be used throughout this Note to refer only to wiretapping (the inter-
ception of wire communications through the use of a listening device attached to the communica-
tion facility) and bugging (the interception of oral communications through the use of a
microphone).
14. Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County for over twenty-seven years,
described wiretapping as "the single most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight against
organized crime." Hearings on S.674 andS.675 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce.
dures of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1092 (1967). See THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 12, at 201.
15. In the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, "[E]lectronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police
omniscient, and police omniscence is one of the most effective tools of tyranny." Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRI-
VACY (1971); Askins, Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REv. 59 (1972); Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, If iretapping, and Your Right to Privacy, 26
FED. COMM. B.J. 1 (1974).
16. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. For detailed discussions on the Supreme Court's treatment of electronic surveillance
prior to Berger and Katz, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FED-
ERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 33-38
(1976); Courtney, supra note 15, at 7-26; Scoular, Ifirelapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional
Developmentfrom Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 513, 515-39 (1968); Note, Federal Deci-
sions on the Constitutionality ofElectronic Surveillance Legislation, I I AM. CIuM. L. REV. 639, 642-
55 (1973).
19. Ex Parte Orders For Eavesdropping, Ch. 676, 1958 N.Y. Laws (declared facially unconsi-
tutional in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)).
20. 388 U.S. at 58 (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 (1966)).
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mand a return on the warrant or provide notice to those persons whose
conversations had been seized.2' An officer executing a wiretap order
under the statute thus had "a roving commission to 'seize' any and all
conversations."22 In Katz the Court clearly established that electronic
eavesdropping is a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.23 Absent any recognized exception to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant clause, 24 government investigators must obtain judicial
authorization prior to any electronic surveillance.25
Although Berger and Katz did not specifically enumerate criteria
that, if met, would enable a wiretapping statute to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, Congress regarded the decisions as a blueprint for its
21. 388 U.S. at 58-60.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). A seminal case in modem fourth amend-
ment doctrine, Katz gave judicial substance to the idea that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. See note 7
supra. In Katz, FBI agents without prior judicial approval attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which defendant made calls to
convey wagering information. 389 U.S. at 348. The agents' conduct "violated the privacy upon
which [defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id at 353.
24. The Court acknowledged, however, that the recognized exceptions to the warrant clause
probably would be unavailable in the context of electronic surveillance. "It is difficult to imagine
how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this
case." Id at 357. C. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search of first-class
letter); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of automobile); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (third-party consent search); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to custodial arrest); Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973) (border search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of moving vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1967) (stop and frisk); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seizure of evidence in plain
view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (close pursuit of fleeing suspect); Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (inventory search of automobile); Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 767
(1966) (preservation of evidence); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport
search).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323, 330 & n.9 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"ITIhe procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate," Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263, 272 (1960) (per curiam affirmance by an equally divided court) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing), not only satisfies the Court's general preference that searches be authorized by warrant, id;
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Ventressa, 380 U.S. 102
(1965), but also acts as an important check on unconfined and indiscriminate electronic surveil-
lance. 389 U.S. at 354-55; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967); Osborn v. United States
385 U.S. 323, 329 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring). This concern over indiscriminate surveillance is the germ of the minimization requirement
in Title III. 53 TUL. L. REv. 264, 266 (1978). See notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text.
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efforts to promote a more effective control of crime consistent with the
individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. 26 Title III of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 represents the arche-
type.27 In accordance with the guidelines suggested by Berger and
Katz, Title III prohibits the interception or disclosure of any wire or
oral communication except by law enforcement officials who have
complied with the detailed procedural requirements prescribed in the
statute.28
26. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in f1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153.
Congress had begun to consider legislation regarding electronic surveillance even before the
Supreme Court decided Berger. Senator McClellan introduced the Federal Wire Interception
Act, S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), on January 25, 1967, less than two months after the Court
granted certiorari in Berger, 385 U.S. 967 (1966). Within days after the Berger decision, Senator
Hruska introduced a second bill, the Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967, S. 2050, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Title III is essentially a combination of the two bills drafted to conform
with the standards set forth in Berger and Katz. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66
(1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). The Supreme Court has issued six opinions interpreting
Title III provisions since the passage of the statute in 1968, but none of the decisions have ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the statute. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974);
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974);
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297 (1972); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Ten of the eleven circuits of the
federal courts of appeals, however, have affirmed the constitutionality of the statute. See United
States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); United States v. Sklar-
off, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d
524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932 (1975); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 866 (1973); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909
(1975); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972). Moreover, all but
one of the federal district courts that have considered the constitutionality of Title III have upheld
the statute, and the sole exception was reversed. See United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp, 358
(E.D. Pa. 1972), rep'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973). Despite the
absence of Supreme Court approval, the constitutionality of Title III seems to be a foregone con-
clusion. Contra, Fife, Eavesdropping Under Court Order and the Constitution. Berger v. New
York, I Loy. U.L. REV. 143 (1968); Schwartz, The Legitimization ofEectranic Eavesdropping: The
Politics of 'aw and Order," 67 MIcH. L. REv. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by
Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). The statute recognizes four exceptions to its procedural require-
ments. Section 2518(7) allows law enforcement officers specially designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral to conduct surveillance without prior judicial authorization in certain emergency situations,
provided that certain post-surveillance requirements are also met. Sections 2511(2)(c) and (d)
exclude from the Title III procedural requirements surveillance conducted with the consent of a
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Applications for wiretap orders first must be authorized by the Attor-
ney General or his special designate2 9 and contain the statutorily speci-
fied information designed to provide a judge with "a full and complete
statement of the facts and circumstances" that justify the proposed
wiretap and establish clear lines of responsibility for its execution." In
addition, applications may be made only in the investigation of certain
major crimes enumerated by the statute.31
Upon review of an application, the judge may issue an interception
order only after determining that normal investigative procedures have
failed and that probable cause exists to believe particular communica-
tions concerning the offense under investigation will be obtained
through the interception. 2
Each authorization order must specify the identity of the person
whose communications are to be intercepted, the place where intercep-
tion is authorized, the particular type of communication sought to be
intercepted, the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the com-
munications, and the period of time during which interception is per-
mitted.33 The order may also require monitoring agents to submit
periodic reports to the issuing judge on the progress of the wiretap to-
ward achievement of the authorized objective and on the need for con-
tinued interception.34
Immediately upon expiration of the order, the intercepting agency
party to the conversation. Sections 2511(2) and (3) permit interception by telephone companies
and the Federal Communications Commission in the absence of a court order if the interception is
within the normal course of their activities. Section 2511(3) creates a "national security" exception
for the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers.
Title III applies not just to federal electronic surveillance activities, but also to wiretaps con-
ducted by state law enforcement officials. By requiring that state statutes conform to the mini-
mum federal standards established by Title III, Congress has preempted those statutes less
restrictive than the federal provisions; the states, however, may adopt statutes affording greater
protection to the fourth amendment right of privacy. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
66 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2187. See also People v.
Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804 (1974);
State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819 (Mass.
1975).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). At the state or local level, the principal prosecuting attorney
for the jurisdiction performs this function. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1970). In addition, the judge may require the applicant to furnish
additional evidence in support of the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2) (1970).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l)(a)-(g) (1970).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970).
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must convey the recordings of the intercepted conversations to the
judge who authorized the wiretap.35 In turn, the judge must seal the
recordings and serve notice of the surveillance upon all parties named
in the interception order and, in the judge's discretion, upon other par-
ties whose conversations were intercepted. 36
Despite the detailed manner in which Title III was drafted, however,
Congress failed to elaborate upon what many regard as the heart of the
statutory safeguards--the minimization requirement:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the au-
thorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to mini-
mize the interception of communications not subject to interception under
this chapter ....
Neither the statute's language nor its legislative history38 prescribes the
procedures that courts should employ to determine whether minimiza-
tion has been achieved.39 Consequently, few provisions of Title III
have engendered as much uncertainty as the minimization require-
ment.
Congress, in the wake of Berger and Katz, could have regarded the
minimization provision in any one of three ways: (1) as a statutory but
not a constitutional requirement;40(2) as the codification of a constitu-
tional requirement;41 or (3) as a statutory requirement stricter than
what the Constitution mandates in the execution of wiretaps.42
The argument on behalf of the first view4 3-that the duty to mini-
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (1970).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970). This section also requires that the government execute the
authorization to intercept as soon as practicable and terminate interception upon attainment of the
authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days. In this Note, however, the term "section
2518(5)" will refer exclusively to the minimization requirement within the provision.
38. The legislative history of the minimization requirement is merely a single-sentence para-
phrase of the statutory language. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2192.
39. See note 4 supra.
40. See notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 49-57 infra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
43. This view is proposed in Note, Minimization: In Search afStandards, 8 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 60, 62-63 (1973). The author also argues that because the large majority of states do not
include a minimization provision in their electronic surveillance statutes, this "reveals a general
belief that 'minimization' is not constitutionally mandated." Id at 63 n.21 (emphasis in original).
Granting whatever validity there may be to the author's inference, the argument is misleading at
best. Included in "the large majority" were twenty-six states that either had no statute concerning
electronic surveillance or had statutes that totally prohibited such activity. Thus, of the twenty-
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mize is solely statutory--derives from the belief that Title III's proba-
ble cause and particularity45 requirements adequately satisfy the
demands of the warrant clause.46 The Berger Court's primary objec-
tion to the New York wiretapping statute47 stemmed from its failure to
require that a wiretap authorization "particularize" the conversations
subject to interception.48 Restricted by the limitations of Title III, how-
ever, monitoring agents no longer have "a roving commission to 'seize'
any and all conversations," 49 nor engage in the kind of general search
proscribed by the fourth amendment.5" The minimization require-
ment, therefore, constitutes a statutory, but not a constitutional, addi-
four states that authorized wiretapping, twelve did not include minimization provisions in their
statutes. Moreover, Title III preempts those state statutes that do not conform to its minimum
federal standards. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprintedin 11968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2187. Thus, Congress' intent about the constitutional necessity of the
minimization requirement is the appropriate focus for analysis.
44. Under the provisions of Title III, a judge may issue an interception order only if he
determines:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has commit-
ted, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter,
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that
offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place
where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or about to
be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the
name of, or commonly used by such person.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970).
45. Interception orders issued pursuant to Title III must include:
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place
where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted,
and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the
person authorizing the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a state-
ment as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has been first obtained.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970).
46. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S.
CONST. amend. IV.
47. See note 19 supra.
48. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
49. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
5o. Id
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tion to the protections of the warrant clause's imperative of
particularity.
The weakness in this view is that the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment is not the sole measure of the constitutionality of a search
and seizure; the fourth amendment also proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a facially
sufficient warrant must be executed in a reasonable manner. 2 Thus,
the second view of the minimization provision argues that section
2518(5), in acting to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, codi-
fies a constitutional requirement for the execution of wiretaps.5 3 The
reasoning of United States v. Kahn54 supports this view. Kahn held
that the admission into evidence of conversations intercepted under a
valid Title III wiretap order against a participant in those conversa-
tions who was not named in the order violates neither Title III nor the
fourth amendment.55 In rejecting the argument that this holding
51. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
52. The original draft of the fourth amendment presented by the Committee of Eleven con-
tained no prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, but only what is now regarded
as the warrant clause. Subsequently, a motion to amend the draft to include this prohibition was
adopted. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789). As explained by one author:
The general right of security from unreasonable search and seizure was given a sanction
of its own and the amendment intentionally given a broader scope. That the prohibition
against "unreasonable searches" was intended, accordingly, to cover something other
than the form of the warrant is a question no longer left to implication to be derived
from the phraseology of the Amendment.
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-35 (1886). The
reasonableness requirement limits the discretion of those who search under a valid warrant. For
government agents to regard "a seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket to get into a
man's home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and indiscriminate
seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of general warrant," is to engage in
both unreasonable and unconstitutional conduct. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 572 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring). See generall, 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 151-84 (1978). Ap-
plication of this principle to of electronic surveillance is straightforward. Once a monitoring
agent determines that a call does not relate to the offense under investigation, he must terminate
the interception, not because he lacked probable cause to initially monitor the call, or failed to
obtain a properly particularized wiretap order, but because it is no longer reasonable to continue
the interception. See Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861, 868-78
(1974).
53. This view is espoused in: Cranwell, Judicial Fine-Tuning of Electronic Surveillance, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 251 (1975); Comment, supra note 12, at 97-98; Note, supra note 52, at
868-78.
54. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
55. Id at 155.
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would permit wiretap orders to be used as general warrants, the Court
specifically noted that the minimization requirement would serve to
circumscribe unconstitutional and unlawful intrusions on individual
privacy.56 The Court's reliance on the minimization requirement,
therefore, strongly implies that the provision has constitutional under-
pinnings.57
The power of legislative bodies to grant greater protection to individ-
ual rights than that minimally afforded by the Constitution creates the
possibility that Congress intended to impose a duty on monitoring
agents beyond that demanded of them by the fourth amendment.5 8
The best argument for this third view of the minimization provision is
that Congress included within Title III a number of safeguards beyond
those delineated in either Berger or Katz.59 Consistent with its concern
for individual privacy, Congress could have intended the minimization
requirement-also not specifically mentioned in either Berger or
Katz-to impose a stricter duty on monitoring agents than that man-
dated by the fourth amendment. This argument, while plausible, is not
compelling. Congress also enacted Title III to provide law enforcement
officials with a necessary tool to fight crime.6" It is equally plausible,
therefore, that the minimization requirement represents nothing more
than a codification of the fourth amendment standard of reasonable-
ness in the execution of wiretaps.61
In summary, no clear answer exists to the question of which of the
56. Id at 154. See Note, supra note 52, at 875-78.
57. Language in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), raises a similar inference:
[lit is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of
the basis on which it was to proceed. and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it
would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the
very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place.
Id at 354 (emphasis added).
58. Under the fifth amendment, for example, a witness summoned to appear and testify
before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on
evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. See United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S.
338 (1974). Under the additional protections afforded by Title III, however, a grand jury witness
may refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained in violation of Title III provisions.
See United States v. Gelbard, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
59. For example, § 2516 limits the issuance of interception orders to the investigation of cer-
tain crimes and requires that applications must be approved by the Attorney General before sub-
mission to a judge for final authorization; also, § 2518(3)(c) requires that interception orders may
issue only if normal investigative procedures have failed.
60. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2157. "The major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime." Id
61. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
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three views embodies Congress' intent concerning the nature and scope
of the minimization requirement. In the absence of a legislative his-
tory, the only safe answer is that Congress did not consider the issue at
all. It does seem fair to conclude, however, that the duty to minimize is
a constitutional duty-the duty to conduct a wiretap in a reasonable
manner.62 But what "reasonableness" entails in the context of elec-
tronic surveillance, or whether Congress intended to supplement or
supplant the fourth amendment reasonableness standard with a stan-
dard affording greater protections for individual privacy, remains a leg-
islative secret.
II. THE MINIMIZATION DOCTRINE PRIOR TO SCo0 '
In the absence of legislative guidance, the burden fell upon the courts
to give substantive meaning to the minimization provision. The first
federal courts to deal with minimization did not directly address the
question whether section 2518(5)'s minimization requirement supple-
mented, codified, or supplanted the fourth amendment in the context of
electronic surveillance. 3 With reference to Berger and Katz' and by
analogy to physical searches and seizures, 65 the initial decisions in-
voked traditional fourth amendment concepts of reasonableness to as-
62. See note 53 supra.
63. See United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774-75 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195-97 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 540-
45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971), rev'don other grounds sub
non United States v. Cerasco, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp.
233, 246-49 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046 (D. Md.) (failure to make any attempt to minimize would obviously be a
blatant violation of Title III as well as a probable fourth amendment violation), a/f'dsub nom.
United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), a'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
64. See United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aJ'dsub non. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir.
1972), aft'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United
States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971), rev'don other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Cerasco, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 246, 248
(D.D.C. 1971), rev'd, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), afdsub nom. United
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aj'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v.
LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 197 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 543-45
(S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920
(1974); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971), rev'don other grounds sub
non United States v. Cerasco, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972).
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sess compliance with the minimization requirement.66 Adoption of
fourth amendment reasonableness doctrine, however, did not simplify
matters. Troublesome differences between electronic surveillance and
conventional physical searches,67 as well as an uncertain understanding
of what minimization meant in fact,68 complicated the courts' task.
66. See United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774-75 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fo-
carile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), a~f'dsub non. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522
(4th Cir. 1972), at'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 197 (W.D.
Pa. 197 1); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 543-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'don other grounds,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp.
1357, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub non United States v. Cerasco, 467 F.2d
647 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 24649 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd 504 F.2d
194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. See United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1018 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020
(1974); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), ajfdsub nonL United States v.
Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), ayj'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). See generally C. FISHMAN,
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 6-11 (1978).
68. In United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478
F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974), the court appeared to regard minimiza-
tion as a requirement for each individual, intercepted conversation. Thus, the court held unrea-
sonable the interception of "a conversation between defendant King and an unidentified female
named Phyllis which ran from page 1328 to page 1372 in the transcript. The conversation was
totally irrelevant except for some two pages right in the middle, in which the conversation turned
briefly but pointedly to the conspiracy." Id at 541.
Generally, however, courts evaluate minimization with reference to the entire surveillance pe-
riod rather than to particular calls. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.) (To
determine compliance, court must "look to whether the agents devised reasonable means of limit-
ing interception."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156
(9th Cir.) ("Minimization as a process ... requires that measures be adopted to reduce the extent
of. . . interception to a practical minimum."), cert denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v.
Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368, 1372 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The procedure testified to by the agents appears a
reasonable method for complying with the order of the district court ... to minimize."); United
States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[Tihere is no question that the procedures
employed in this case to effect minimization pass muster."); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d
764, 784 (2d Cir.) (monitoring agents used "reasonable guidelines"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973); United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 870-71 (D.N.J. 1977) ("The facts contained in the
affidavits submitted by the government ... detail the guidelines and procedures established by
the supervising attorney and agent in charge"), aj'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir.
1978); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974) ("What is involved is a procedure.").
Those courts that emphasize the attempt to discern a pattern of nonpertinent communications
during the surveillance period also appear to regard minimization as a process rather than an act
to be evaluated with respect to each individual call. See notes 81-84 infra and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon to find courts that use the term "minimize" to mean both the
actions taken during the surveillance period to comply with the minimization requirement and the
noninterception of a particular call in its entirety. See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 157
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir.
1975); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 728 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); People v. Floyd, 41
N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976).
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Pragmatically, the courts chose a case-by-case approach. 69 In recogni-
tion that some innocent communications inevitably will be intercepted
however carefully monitoring agents attempt to minimize, 70 courts be-
gan to investigate particular facts and circumstances within the knowl-
edge of the monitoring agents during the surveillance period to gauge
the reasonableness of their minimization efforts.7 1 To systematize this
69. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied,
522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. James, 494 F.2d
1007, 1018 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Manfedi, 488 F.2d 588,
598-99 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp.
1033, 1047 (D. Md.), qf'dsub nont United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), a7'd,
416 U.S. 505 (1974).
70. The court in United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aptly stated
that "monitoring agents are not gifted with prescience and cannot be expected to know in advance
what direction the conversation will take." Id at 196. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d
751, 754 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United
States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046 (D. Md.), a9'dsub nom. United State v. Giordano, 469
F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aj'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
71. See United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942
(1978) (large-scale drug ring; uncertain identities of participants; code words and jargon); United
States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976) (coded language;
initially innocent calls that later turned to discussions of narcotics); United States v. Losing, 539
F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1976) (far-flung criminal conspiracy; specialized jargon); United
States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 492-94 (9th Cir.) (extensive conspiracy with partially unknown
membership; foreign languages; jargon; code words; participants came from many walks of life
and included professionals), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d
143, 157-58 (9th Cir.) (conspiracy among large number of people of largely unknown identity;
code and guarded language), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d
267, 273 (2d Cir. 1974) (excessive background noise at location of tapped phone; code; limited
duration of most intercepted calls), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1973) (million dollar drug business; numerous narcotics distribu-
tors involved; numerous callers; complex, surreptitious calls; authorized purpose of surveillance
was to determine nature and scope of conspiracy; calls made at all hours of day and night), cerl.
denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500 (2d Cir, 1973) (short
duration of most calls; massive drug conspiracy; other crimes involved, including murder and
robbery), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293,
1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972) (organized criminal conspiracy; colloquial code), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1974); United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862, 871-72 (D.N.J. 1977) (target of wiretap legiti-
mately engaged in business of selling salvage and bankruptcy property, but also fenced stolen
property), ai'don other ground, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Falcone, 364 F.
Supp. 877, 886 (D.N.J. 1973) (large-scale international narcotics conspiracy; guarded and coded
language); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 437 (D. Md. 1973) (calls that began with
innocent conversation became crime-related); United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 744-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (widespread narcotics conspiracy; use of code; large number of participants),
a)'d, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); United States v. Focarile, 340 F.
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process, several courts adopted a three-part categorization of factors
relevant to the degree of minimization required in a particular case: (1)
the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation; (2)
the government's reasonable expectation of the parties to, and content
of, the intercepted conversations; and (3) the degree of judicial supervi-
sion exercised during the course of the surveillance.72
The first category of factors leads courts to examine the nature and
scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation for practical diffi-
culties that hamper a monitoring agent's ability to distinguish between
pertinent and nonpertinent communications. When the offense under
investigation is a large-scale conspiracy, courts generally allow a
greater margin for error in the number of innocent calls intercepted.73
Supp. 1033, 1047-50 (D. Md.) (purpose of wiretape was to determine scope of narcotics conspir-
acy, some communications used guarded and coded language), afd sub nom. United States v.
Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 92,
338 A.2d 284, 292 (1975) (tapped phone was central instrument in narcotics distribution; monitor-
ing agents suspected defendant knew of surveillance; code used); People v. Solomon, 75 Misc. 2d
847, 849-50, 348 N.Y.S.2d 673, 676-78 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (purpose of wiretap was to determine scope
of conspiracy).
72. See United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 579
F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1274 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 852-53 (3d Cir.
1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975);
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975).
The District of Columbia Circuit and two federal district courts have employed a four-part
categorization first detailed in United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-21, (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974): (1) the scope of the criminal enterprise under investigation; (2) the
location and operation of the subject telephone; (3) the government's expectation of the content of
the intercepted calls; and (4) the supervision by the authorizing judge. Id See United States v.
Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 758-60 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. London, 434 F. Supp. 556, 562-64 (D. Md.
1976), a9'd sub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 258-60 (D. Kan. 1975). The three-part categorization, first employed in
United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975), derives substantially from the
James formulation. See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 67, at 210-32.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Vento,
533 F.2d 838, 853 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 493-94 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 39 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974). Cf. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 540-41 (S.D. Cal. 1971)
(interception of all calls held unreasonable in narrowly focused investigation), rev'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
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Similarly, when the range of offenses under investigation encompasses
multiple and diverse crimes, courts tolerate the interception of more
calls unrelated to those offenses.74 Courts also permit the interception
of a great many innocent communications when the targets of the in-
vestigation use guarded or ambiguous language,75 codes, 76 aliases, 77 or
foreign languages.78 In addition, if the objective of the wiretap is to
determine the scope of a conspiracy and the identity of the coconspira-
tors, courts impose less exacting minimization standards.79
The government's reasonable expectations of the parties to, and the
content of, intercepted communications form the second category of
factors germane to the minimization inquiry. Courts consider the loca-
tion of the wiretapped telephone to be crucial to this determination."
Agents monitoring conversations over telephones located in the sus-
pected headquarters of a criminal operation may reasonably expect
that virtually all conversations will be pertinent to their investigation,8"
74. See, e.g., United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 862 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
ground, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 942 (1978); United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 930 (1978).
77. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858
(1975).
78. See United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911
(1976); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 717 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 930 (1978); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chavez,
433 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Quintana, 509 F.2d
867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), aft'dsub nor.
United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), afd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); People v. Solomon, 75 Misc. 2d 847, 850, 348 N.Y.S.2d 673, 676-77 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 758-60 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane de.
nied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. James, 494
F.2d 1007, 1019-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. London, 434 F.
Supp. 556, 562-64 (D. Md. 1976), afifdsub nom. United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 930 (1978); United States v. Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 258-60 (D. Kan.
1975).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 711, 715-18 (4th Cir. 1977) (defendants'
office bugged), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1021-23
(D.C. Cir.) (defendant's residential phone used almost exclusively as "business" phone), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977) (defendant's
office phone tapped), afl'd, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978).
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but the same expectation may be unreasonable when agents monitor a
residential or public telephone. 82 Monitoring agents' reasonable expec-
tations also depend on the point during the surveillance period that an
interception occurs." At the outset of a surveillance period, monitor-
ing agents may have no basis to believe that any identifiable group of
calls or callers will be irrelevant to their investigation, but if a discerni-
ble group emerges during the course of the wiretap, courts expect moni-
toring agents to cease interception of that group. 4 Even if a pattern of
nonpertinent calls becomes apparent, however, courts have found it
reasonable for monitoring agents to screen the first one or two minutes
of each call to verify that the call fits the pattern.85
82. See United States v. Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 259 (D. Kan. 1975) (minimization efforts
reasonable on residential phone); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195-97 (W.D. Pa.
1971) (minimization efforts during surveillance of residential phone unreasonable). But see
United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir.) ("IT]he fact that [telephones] were located in
residences does not immunize them from a court ordered interception. The actual use of the
telephones is at least as relevant to the question of the level of surveillance which is reasonable as
is their physical location."), rehearing en bane denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 917 (1976).
As to public telephones, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the Supreme
Court approved of the "narrowly circumscribed" manner in which federal agents had conducted
electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth, id at 354, but held the search illegal because
of the agents' failure to obtain prior judicial authorization. Id at 359.
83. See generally C. FISHMAN, supra note 67, at 216-21.
84. See United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434,441 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chavez, 533
F.2d 491, 493-94 n.2 (9th Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
If any pattern of innocent communications is evident at the initiation of the surveillance, courts
expect monitoring agents to respect it in their minimization efforts. United States v. James, 494
F.2d 1007, 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
The effort to discover a pattern of innocent communications can, of itself, support a finding that
the agents' minimization attempts were reasonable. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002,
1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 783 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
Two courts have found that the interception of all calls was reasonable because the surveillance
period was too brief to allow agents to develop patterns of nonpertinent calls. See United States v.
Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); United States v.
Chavez, 533 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976).
85. See United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 909 n.l (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075
(1977); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 157 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975);
United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 757 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 522 F.2d 1333
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
In United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), the
court held that the conspirators' use of code justified the agents' interception of the first five min-
utes of each call. Some courts, in their determination of the reasonableness of the agents' minimi-
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The degree of judicial supervision over the execution of the wiretap
constitutes the third category of factors critical to the pre-Scott applica-
tion of the minimization requirement. When the judge who authorized
the interception order plays an active role in the effort to minimize,
courts more likely will find compliance with the minimization require-
ment.816 This supervision may take several forms such as detailing min-
imization procedures in the wiretap order87 or requiring periodic
reports on the progress of the investigation and the need for continued
surveillance.18
Although the courts generally invoked traditional fourth amendment
concepts of reasonableness to determine compliance with the minimi-
zation requirement, many-but by no means a1189-courts indicated
zation efforts, have employed similar reasoning to disregard all calls of less than two minutes
duration. See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 757 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 522
F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. ), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490,
500 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
86. See cases cited note 72 supra.
87. United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972).
88. See cases cited note 72 supra. See also United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 501 (2d
Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293,
1301 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1048 (D. Md.), a f'dsub norn.
United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aid on other grounds, 416 U.S. 505
(1974).
89. A significant number of cases make no explicit mention of "good faith." See United
States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1977); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Doolit-
tle, 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Piccone, 408 F. Supp. 255 (D. Kan. 1975);
United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a 'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert,
denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United
States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md.), a'fdsub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d
522 (4th Cir. 1972), aft'don other grounds, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F.
Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'don other
grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); State v. Molinaro, 117
N.J. Super. 276, 284 A.2d 385 (Essex County Ct. 1971); People v. Castania, 73 Misc. 2d 166, 340
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1973); People v. Holder, 69 Misc. 2d 863, 331 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
Arguably, the following language from United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973), posits a minimization standard that contains an element of subjective
or good-faith reasonableness:
It is clear. . . that a court should not admit evidence derived from an electronic sur-
veillance order unless, after reviewing the monitoring log and hearing the testimony of
the monitoring agents, it is left with the conviction that on the whole the agents have
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that the presence or absence of good-faith efforts by the monitoring
agents to minimize was also relevant to their determinations.9" These
courts either explicitly included "good faith" in the standard for testing
compliance with the minimization requirement9 or explicitly found
that the agents made "good faith" efforts to minimize.92 The precise
shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to
avoid unnecessary intrusion.
Id at 784. No specific reference to good faith or subjective intent can be found in this language,
however, and those courts that quote this language with approval do not otherwise mention good
faith or subjective intent. See United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1018 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (D.N.J. 1977), ajr'don
other grounds, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978). The court in United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751
(D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 522 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917
(1976), offered its interpretation of this language from Tortorello: "While this language indicates
that the attitude of the agents is a relevant factor to be considered, we believe that the decisive
factor is the second element--the objective reasonableness of the interceptions." Id at 756 n.12.
90. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hinton,
543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v. Principie, 531
F.2d 1132, 1139-41 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. Turner, 528
F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29,
44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United State v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Manfredi, 488-
F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 435 F.2d
491, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 902 (1974); United States v. Fino, 478
F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United
States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp.
877, 886-87 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 437 (D. Md. 1973); Rodri-
guez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 95, 338 A.2d 284, 291
(1975); People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976).
91. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975);
United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United
States v. Manfredi, 448 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United
States v. Aloi, 499 F. Supp. 698, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1977): United States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285,
305 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886-87 (D.N.J. 1973); Rodriguez
v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 95, 338 A.2d 284, 291 (1975);
People v. Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976).
92. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hinton,
543 F.2d 1002, 1112 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); United States v Turner, 528 F.2d
143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v.
Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886-87 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 437
(D. Md. 1973); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 95, 338 A.2d 284, 291 (1975); People v. Floyd, 41
N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976).
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role or meaning of good faith in the minimization inquiry, however,
never received careful analysis or articulation in the courts.
93
On one level of analysis, judicial consideration of good faith appears
to split the standard of review for minimization into two components-
a subjective determination of whether the monitoring agents demon-
strated good-faith efforts to minimize the interception of nonpertinent
calls and an objective evaluation of whether the agents' efforts were
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known to them at the
time of the interception. 94 This two-part standard thus accords "good
faith" an interstitial role in effectuating the protections of Title III and
the fourth amendment. 95 A deeper level of analysis, however, suggests
that the courts' consideration of good faith is anomalous-a govern-
ment agent's good faith ordinarily is irrelevant to the constitutional
validity of a search and seizure.96 Moreover, neither minimiza-
Five cases that explicitly used the term "good faith" do not fit the "standard or finding" catego-
rization. Four of these courts made only passing reference to "good faith," noting only that courts
are more willing to find a good-faith attempt to minimize when the authorizing judge requires and
reviews regular reports from monitoring agents on the course of the electronic surveillance. See
United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978);
United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 442 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867,
875 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 491, 501 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). In the fifth case, United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977), the court considered "good faith" relevant to correct
application of the exclusionary rule rather than to the determination of a violation of the minimi-
zation requirement.
93. The National Wiretapping Commission, for example, reached only general conclusions,
"In dealing with the minimization problem, reviewing courts appear to place much weight on the
subjective intention of the officials in trying to effect proper minimization." Zuckerman & Lyons,
Strategies and Tactics in the Prosecution and Defense af Complex Wire-Interception Cases, in Com-
MISSION STUDIES, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAws RE-
LATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 40 (1976). "Courts are exceedingly
interested in the good faith (or lack of good faith) of the monitoring authorities in this area." Id
at 49.
94. See C. FISHMAN, supra note 67, at 205.
95. Id at 230-32. See also United States v. Scott, 522 F.2d 1333, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Robinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
96. The distinction between subjective and objective factors in search and seizure law differs
from that in tort law. In the latter, subjective considerations concern attributes of a specific indi-
vidual that vary from those of the reasonable, prudent person. See generally W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 149-66 (4th ed. 1971). Rather than the actual facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the actor, tort law considers the facts and circumstances
that, hypothetically, would have been within the knowledge of the reasonable, prudent person in
the identical situation. Id In search and seizure law, however, the facts and circumstances actu-
ally known to the specific government agent comprise the elements of objective reasonableness.
See generaliy I W. LAFAVE, supra note 52, at 459-61. If these facts and circumstances would
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tion 7 nor good faith seems susceptible to any well-determined or read-
ily applicable definition; rather, each seems to require reference to a
standard.98 Whether those courts which explicitly referred to good
faith did, in fact, adopt a dual standard incorporating considerations of
both subjective and objective reasonableness deserves further examina-
tion.
Although some courts explicitly supplemented their minimization
standard with the element of good faith, they nevertheless confined
their analyses to facts and circumstances within the monitoring agents'
knowledge during the surveillance period; in other words, objective
factors.9 9 Another court employed the same type of objective analysis
allow a person of reasonable prudence to conclude that an offense has or is being committed-in
the case of arrest-or that the particularized items are in the place detailed-in the case of
search-the government agent may either obtain a warrant or, when exigent circumstances are
present, act on those facts and circumstances without a warrant. With or without a warrant, the
agent acts in an objectively reasonable manner. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968);
Draper v. United States 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
Facts A, B, and C can be hypothesized as the minimum "quantity" of knowledge necessary and
sufficient in any given situation to establish objective reasonableness in the law of search and
seizure. A reasonable, prudent person in that situation might inevitably be aware of all three facts;
yet, if a particular government agent in an identical situation possesses only facts .4 and C, his
actions cannot be objectively reasonable. Neither the good faith of the government agent nor his
subjective intent to act lawfully can, in terms of the hypothetical, substitute for the missing fact, B.
See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Conversely, if the government agent possesses all
three facts, then his actions are objectively reasonable and it is unnecessary to investigate the
government agent's subjective intent or good faith. By setting a minimum "quantity" of knowl-
edge in terms of facts and circumstances, the standard of objective reasonableness limits the abil-
ity of government agents to act lawfully on the basis of suspicion or hunch, no matter how
honestly held. See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396-97 (1979). Thus, reasonableness in
search and seizure law is an objective standard that encompasses only facts and circumstances, not
subjective intent or good faith. Id See Commonwealth v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 561 (1967)
(White, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted).
97. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 96 supra.
99. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975);
United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United
States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United
States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp.
877, 886-88 (D.NJ. 1973); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 95, 338 A.2d 284, 291 (1975); People v.
Floyd, 41 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976). See also notes 71-
72 supra and accompanying text.
Although the court in Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974), used a minimization
standard that incorporated "good faith," the issue in the case concerned the appropriate applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to the violation of the minimization requirement.
Washington University Open Scholarship
622 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:601
to conclude that the agents made good-faith efforts to minimize.'00
Each approach, however, actually failed to inquire into the subjective
intent of the monitoring agents.10' Moreover, none of these courts
found that the minimization effort was unreasonable solely because of
the absence of good faith;0 2 in fact, all of these decisions held that the
monitoring agents complied with the minimization requirement. 03
For these courts, a finding of good faith followed not from any in-
dependent assessment of the agents' intent to minimize, but solely from
a finding that the agents made an objectively reasonable effort to com-
ply with the minimization requirement.
Good faith seemed to be more important to the analysis of those
courts that held that the interception of nonpertinent conversations
during the course of the surveillance period does not vitiate the wiretap
so long as a good-faith effort to minimize is apparent.t°4 Yet none of
100. See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S, 823
(1975).
101. Several courts, however, have noted that monitoring agents had been given some instruc-
tions on minimization or were aware of the minimization requirement in the authorization order.
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United
States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v.
Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2dCir. 1974); United States v. Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 305 (E.D. Pa.
1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886-88 (D.N.J. 1973); People v. Floyd, 41
N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1975).
102. But see Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974). Agents monitored all calls in
their entirety over two of the tapped telephones during the surveillance period. Although the
court noted that the agents had terminated a tap on a third telephone over which no pertinent
conversations were intercepted prior to the end of the surveillance period, it found that the agents
made no effort whatsoever to minimize interceptions on the remaining two taps. In the sense that
the absence of any attempt to minimize demonstrates a lack of good faith, it might be said that the
court found a violation of the minimization requirement, at least in part, from the absence of
subjective intent to minimize. The court's language supports this conslusion:
What is involved is a procedure toward which the statute is directed and requires
reasonable effort to minimize interception of non-pertinent communications. The fact
that non-pertinent calls were intercepted, or that hindsight shows a better means of meet-
ing the requirement, is irrelevant so long as a good-faith effort was made to comply with
the requirement.
Id (emphasis in original).
103. See United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975);
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975); United
States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Baynes, 400 F. Supp. 285, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886-88
(D.N.J. 1973); Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 95, 338 A.2d 284, 291 (1975); People v. Floyd, 41
N.Y.2d 245, 250, 360 N.E.2d 935, 940, 392 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (1976).
104. United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1012 (2d Cir.) ("[W]hile it may fairly be said that
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these courts indicated-much less held-that a showing of a good faith
is, in itself, sufficient to find compliance with the minimization require-
ment when an objective evaluation of the agents' conduct does not sup-
port this finding.'0 5 Consistent with the notion that good faith, per se,
is insufficient to cure a constitutional or statutory violation, 10 6 objective
reasonableness thus seems to be a condition precedent to the evaluation
of monitoring agents' subjective good faith. No court, however, has
determined that minimization efforts, otherwise objectively reasonable,
were inadequate because monitoring agents failed to act in good
faith.0 7 Again, it appears that objective factors are dispositive and that
the agents did not strictly adhere to the minimization instructions, it appears that a good faith
attempt was made to limit intrusion into private intimacies."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976);
United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.) ("[W]e believe the monitoring agents exer-
cised their discretion in a good faith effort to minimize, even though it now appears by hindsight
that a number of intercepted calls could have been terminated at an earlier time."), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Even assuming
arguendo that some of the conversations completely listened to were in fact nonpertinent, the
surveillance would not necessarily have violated the minimization requirement of the statutue,
assuming a good faith effort had been made to achieve such minimization."); United States v.
Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 886-87 (D.N.J. 1973) ("[Where a good faith reasonable effort has been
made to minimize the interceptions, the interception will be valid even though some calls of a
non-pertinent nature were monitored."); Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974) ("The
fact that non-pertinent calls were intercepted, or that hindsight shows a better means of meeting
the requirement, is irrelevant so long as a good-faith effort was made to comply with the require-
ment.").
105. Cf. United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974). This court used the term good faith to state the proper standard to determine compliance
with the minimization requirement. Id at 600. Yet, although the agents monitored and recorded
all incoming and outgoing calls over the wiretapped telephones in their entirety, irrespective of the
identity of the parties to the conversation, the court analyzed the asserted failure to minimize in
terms of objective factors and, in fact, concluded that the government had established a prima
facie case of compliance with the minimization requirement. Id at 599-600.
106. See note 96 supra.
107. It appears that only eight courts have held that monitoring agents failed to comply with
the minimization requirement. See United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1139-41 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajf'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 543-44 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
rer'don other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); Rodriguez v.
State, 297 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1974); State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J. Super. 276, 284, 284 A.2d 385, 394
(Essex County Ct. 1971); People v. Solomon, 75 Misc. 2d 847, 850-51, 348 N.Y.S.2d 673, 678 (Sup.
Ct. 1973); People v. Castania, 73 Misc.2d 166, 172, 340 N.Y.S.2d 829, 835-36 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
Only in United States v. King did the court not find a blatant violation of the minimization
requirement when the monitoring agents made no attempt to minimize. Id Further, it seems
doubtful that the strict approach taken by King remains a good law. See, e.g., United States v.
Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 485
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a finding of objective reasonableness implicitly presumes a good-faith
effort.
Those courts that utilized the term good faith, but ruled on the mini-
mization issue without an evidentiary hearing'08 or in reliance on sta-
tistics and affidavits submitted by the government on the degree of
minimization practiced by the monitoring agents, 0 9 further obscure the
actual role of good faith in assessing compliance with the minimization
requirement. Because it is unlikely that the government submitted evi-
dence demonstrating the absence of a good-faith effort to minimize, or
that a defendant could prove the absence of good faith without an evi-
dentiary hearing, these courts' use of the term good faith is nebulous at
best."t0 Courts that shifted the burden of proof to the defendant upon
the government's prima facie showing of reasonable efforts to minimize
also make it difficult to discern the true function of good faith in the
minimization inquiry."' It is unrealistic to expect defendants to over-
come their burden of proof, especially when courts require defendants
to show a more effective method of minimization than the monitoring
agents employed. 12 In no case in which the burden of proof shifted
F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). Nevertheless, the court in
King based its holding on the inadequancy of monitoring agents' efforts to minimize rather than
on the absence of good faith. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 543-44 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
See also note 102 supra.
108. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cirillo,
499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
109. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Turner,
528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d
872, 881 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Aloi,
449 F. Supp. 698, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 437 (D. Md.
1973).
110. An analogous situation exists when defendants attempt to dispute the veracity of affida-
vits submitted by the government in support of search and arrest warrants. Unless an evidentiary
hearing is held, it generally is impossible for defendants to discover misstatements in an affidavit.
Without evidentiary hearings on issues other than the veracity of the warrant affidavit, defendants
have no realistic opportunity to expose the misstatements of affiants and informants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d
322, 324 n.1 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971).
111. See United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Turner,
528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d
29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875-76
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Man-
fredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Aloi, 449
F. Supp. 698, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
112. See United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823
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did a defendant prevail on the minimization issue.' 3
All in all, the plain meaning of the term good faith is the strongest
argument for the notion that some courts tested compliance with the
minimization requirement against a standard of reasonableness that in-
corporates both subjective and objective components." 4 Examination
of the reasoning in these cases, however, diminishes the force of the
argument." 5 Certainly, no serious argument could be made that good
faith is totally irrelevant to fourth amendment protections," 16 but good
faith or subjective intent does not emerge from the case law as an inte-
gral, essential element of the minimization requirement. To the extent
that the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case demonstrate rea-
sonable minimization, good faith is implicit in the standard for measur-
ing compliance with the requirement. The courts' primary focus,
however, is usually on objective reasonableness as established by facts
and circumstances within the knowledge of the monitoring agents dur-
ing the surveillance period.17
III. UNITED STATES V. ScoTT: THE DECISION AND ITS REASONING
Upon its initial consideration of the minimization issue, the district
court in United States v. Scott' I granted petitioners' pretrial motion to
suppress all conversations intercepted under the wiretap order on the
ground that the agents' interception of all calls, only forty percent of
which the agents believed to be narcotics-related, established a failure
to minimize. 19 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district
court should have engaged in a particularized assessment of the agents'
attempts to minimize in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the
circumstances surrounding its execution rather than have based its de-
termination on a statistical comparison of the number of narcotics-re-
(1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
113. See cases cited note I11 supra.
114. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 99-113 supra and accompanying text.
116. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) ("In deciding today that, in certain
circumstances, a challenge to a warrant's veracity must be permitted, we derive our ground from
the language of Warrant Clause itself, which surely takes the affiant's good faith as its premise
117. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
118. 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
119. Id at 247-48.
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lated calls with the total number of calls intercepted.' 20 The appellate
court directed the district court to reevaluate the motion to suppress in
light of United States v. James12 ' and to accept into evidence the gov-
ernment's call analysis.'2 2 On remand, the district court rejected the
government's call analysis as "an after-the-fact non-validated presenta-
tion of counsel"'' 3 and again ordered suppression of the intercepted
conversations.' 24 The district court found that the monitoring agents
made no attempt to comply with the minimization requirement 125 and
held the agents' "admitted knowing and purposeful failure" to attempt
even "lip service" compliance rendered the interceptions unreasonable
per se.' 2 6 The court of appeals reversed for a second time, again find-
ing that the district court applied an improper standard to measure
minimization:
The presence or absence of a good faith attempt to minimize on the part
of the agents is undoubtedly one factor to be considered in assessing
whether the minimization requirement has been satisfied, but the decision
on the suppression motion must ultimately be based on the reasonable-
ness of the actual interceptions and not on whether the agents subjectively
intended to minimize their interceptions.'
2 7
Applying this standard to the facts, the court of appeals then held that
the interception and monitoring of all calls was not unreasonable under
120. 504 F.2d 194, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
121. 494 F.2d 1007, 1018 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974). The court of appeals
in Scott had delayed decision on the district court's suppression order pending resolution of
James. 504 F.2d at 195.
122. id at 198-99.
123. Joint Appendix to Brief of Petitioners at 38, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
See also United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting from the district
court's unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
124. United States v. Scott, No. 1088-70 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) (unpublished opinion), rep"d,
516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976). This unpublished opinion is
printed in full in the Joint Appendix to Brief of Petitioners and Brief of the United States at 35-39,
United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
125. Joint Appendix to Brief of Petitioners at 36, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)
("[M]onitoring agents made no attempt to comply with the minimization order of the Court but
listened to and recorded all calls over the Jenkins telephone. They showed no regard for the right
of privacy and did nothing to avoid unnecessary intrusion.") (Finding of Fact No. 4). See also
United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
126. Joint Appendix to Brief of Petitioners at 39, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)
(Conclusion of Law No. 4). See also United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). The district court stated that the monitoring agents' conduct
would have been held "unreasonable even if every intercepted call were narcotic related." Id
127. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917
(1976).
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the circumstances in this case. 12
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners contended that both the
fourth amendment and section 2518(5) require courts to employ a two-
part analysis to determine compliance with the minimization require-
ment. 29 To accept into evidence conversations seized under a Title III
wiretap order, a court must first establish that the monitoring agents
made a good-faith effort to minimize the interception of nonpertinent
conversations. 30 Only then should the court evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the agents' minimization efforts in light of the particular facts
and circumstances of the case.' 3' The Government maintained that the
monitoring agents' subjective intent does not render a wiretap either
unconstitutional under the fourth amendment or unlawful under Title
111.132 Only after a court determines on the basis of an objective assess-
128. 516 F.2d at 755-56, 760. The court of appeals arrived at this holding in two ways. First, it
accepted the government's call analysis as an accurate characterization of the interceptions and
concluded that the agents had intercepted no conversations that they clearly would not have inter-
cepted had they made reasonable attempts at minimization. Id at 758. Second, the court applied
the James test to the facts and determined that total interception was not unreasonable under the
circumstances of the case. Id at 758-60.
The court of appeals did not rule that the district court's fourth finding of fact, see note 125
supra, was clear error. Indeed, it is arguable that the court of appeals accepted this finding, but
read it only to mean that all calls had been intercepted and monitored in their entirety. Support
for this argument can be found in the appellate court's less than careful use of the term minimize.
See note 68 supra. It is clear, looking at the decision as a whole, that the court of appeals re-
garded minimization as a procedure to be developed and applied by the monitoring agents during
execution of the wiretap. See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754-55, 758-60 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cen. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976). Nevertheless, the court of appeals also used the term
"minimize" as a synonym for "terminate." "To hold that the monitoring agents must make a
determination whether to minimize in the course of each individual conversation would be an
open invitation to criminals to escape detection." Id at 754. It seems reasonable, therefore, to
read the court's statement that, "Throughout these proceedings the Government has conceded that
its agents did not minimize the interception of any conversations," id at 755, to mean only that
the government conceded that all calls were intercepted in their entirety. The district court also
was not rigorous in its use of the term minimize. See Brief of the United States at 37 n.25 ("The
[district] court consistently used the term 'minimization' as a synonym for non-interception ....
although the concepts are in fact quite different."). It is thus conceivable that the court of appeals
accepted this finding of fact in the narrowest sense factually possible, but rejected the conclusion
that total interception violates the minimization requirement as a matter of law.
129. United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 135, 138 (1978).
130. Id at 135.
131. Id
132. Id at 136. The Government also argued that even if the Court found that the agents had
violated the minimization requirement, Title III mandates suppression of only those conversations
unlawfully intercepted rather than suppression of all conversations intercepted during the surveil-
lance period. Id at 135-36 n.10. In addition, the Government contended that petitioner Scott did
not have standing to raise a minimization challenge to those conversations to which he was not a
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ment of the agents' conduct that a constitutional or statutory violation
has occurred does the agents' subjective intent become relevant;
namely, when the court fashions a remedy appropriate to the violation
in light of the deterrent purposes of the fourth amendment. 33
Persuaded by the Government's position, the Court first rejected pe-
titioner's argument that the agents' subjective intent alone could make
the execution of a wiretap unconstitutional. 34 The majority 35 held
that any search and seizure, including electronic surveillance, complies
with the fourth amendment so long as the facts and circumstances at
the time of the action satisfy the standard of objective reasonable-
ness. 136 The Court then summarily dismissed petitioners' second argu-
ment that the agents' admitted failure to make good-faith efforts at
minimization establishes a violation Title III.137 Quoting from Title
III's legislative history, the majority concluded that Congress did not
intend the statute to press beyond general search and seizure doc-
party. Id Finally, the Government maintained that the record did not support the district court's
finding that the agents subjectively intended to violate either Title III or the fourth amendment.
Id at 136-37 n. 11. Because of the manner in which the Court disposed of the case, it did not reach
these issues. Id at 136 nn.10 & 11.
133. Id at 135-36.
134. id at 137-38.
135. Justice Brennan dissented and filed a separate opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
Id at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 137-38. Although the Court conceded that it had not explicitly addressed in
prior decisions the relevance of a government agent's subjective intent to the lawfulness of a
search and seizure, it failed to devote much analysis to the issue. The majority rested its conclu-
sion on two cases, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973). Terry, which established the stop-and-frisk encounter between police and citizens as a
search and seizure within the purview of the fourth amendment, contains the following language
quoted with approval by the Court in Scott: "[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard; would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."
436 U.S. at 137 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). In Robinson defendant claimed
that the police officer who made a search incident to defendant's lawful arrest did not actually
believe that defendant was armed; thus, the officer's "motivation for the search did not coincide
with the legal justification for the search-incident-to-arrest exception." Id at 138 (citing United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)). The Robinson Court rejected this attempt to import
subjective considerations into the analysis of the legality of the search. 414 U.S. at 236.
The dissent in Scott was unimpressed with the majority's analysis on this issue. "None of the
cases discussed [in the majority's opinion] deciding the reasonableness under the Fourth Amend-
ment of searches and seizures deals with the discrete problems of wire interceptions or addresses
the construction of the minimization requirement of § 2518(5)." 436 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See text accompanying notes 164-68 infra.
137. 436 U.S. at 138-39.
138. Id at 139.
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trine. t38 More importantly, the Court construed Congress' use of the
verb "conducted" in section 2518(5) to mean that only monitoring
agents' actions-not motives-are relevant to determining compliance
with the minimization requirement. 139
In its own evaluation of the interceptions in Scott, the Court disre-
garded all wrong numbers, calls of less than ninety-seconds duration,
and "ambiguous" calls, 40 because they did not enable the monitoring
agents to develop a pattern of nonpertinent calls. 14 ' Along with the
139. The majority asserted that the legislative history of Title III dispels "any lingering doubt"
over the role of good faith or subjective intent in the minimization inquiry. Id To sustain its
assertion, however, the majority erroneously referred to the legislative history of § 2515, which
prohibits the use of evidence derived from electronic surveillance in violation of Title III, rather
than to that of § 2518(5), which contains the minimization requirement. As discussed earlier, the
legislative history of Title III provides no clear answer to the question of Congress' intent concern-
ing the minimization provision. See notes 39-65 supra and accompanying text.
140. 436 U.S. at 139. Totally at odds with this construction of the statute, Justice Brennan
accused the majority of reducing the minimization requirement to a mere "precatory suggestion."
Id at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 156-58 infra and accompanying text. Statutory
interpretation, in fact, is at the crux of the dissent's differences with the majority. To the dissent-
ers, minimization is a "congressionally imposed duty" that supplements to the protections of the
fourth amendment. 436 U.S. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 37-62 supra and ac-
companying text. Thus, the basic premise of Title III, the "unambiguous congressional purpose"
as revealed in the legislative history and the language of the minimization requirement-not
"'general Fourth Amendment principles"-all provide the applicable precedent for establishing
the test for compliance with § 2518(5). 436 U.S. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because a
good-faith effort to minimize is congressionally rather than constitutionally mandated, the dissent-
ers would depart from conventional search and seizure doctrine, see note 90 supra, to argue that
good faith is an additional requirement rather than a substitute for objective reasonableness anal-
vsis. Justice Brennan, however, failed to elaborate the manner in which good faith would afford
protection to reasonable expectations of privacy beyond that ensured by objective-reasonableness.
In the context of searches incident to arrests on administrative warrants, Justice Brennan re-
marked on the judicial difficulty in coping with good faith. "The remedy is not to invite fruitless
litigation into the purity of official motives, or the specific direction of official purposes. One may
always assume that the officers are zealous to perform their duty." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 254 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). If by "good-faith effort to minimize" Justice Brennan
meant only that the government must demonstrate procedures and steps taken to minimize, it is
unnecessary to resort to subjective investigations of good faith. See notes 153-74 infra and accom-
panying text.
141. 436 U.S. at 141-42. "A large number [of calls] were ambiguous in nature, making charac-
terization virtually impossible until the completion of these calls. And some of the nonpertinent
conversations were one-time conversations." Id at 142. Without endorsing the categorization
employed by lower courts, see notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text, the majority posited
several factors that courts could consider in evaluating monitoring agents' attempts to minimize:
(I) the location and use of the subject telephone; (2) the nature, scope, and participants of the
criminal enterprise under investigation; and (3) the likelihood that a pattern of nonpertinent calls
can be developed by monitoring agents. 436 U.S. at 140-41. These factors are similar, if not
identical, to those employed by lower courts. See notes 71-88 supra and accompanying text.
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calls originally characterized by monitoring agents as narcotics-related,
the Court thus reduced the number of potentially unreasonable inter-
ceptions to seven conversations between one of the petitioners and her
mother. 142 The Court, however, also found these interceptions reason-
able under the circumstances.143
Notably absent from the majority's reasoning is any consideration of
the district court's fourth finding of fact: "[Mionitoring agents made no
attempt to comply with the minimization order of the Court but lis-
tened to and recorded all calls over the Jenkins telephone. They
showed no regard for the right of privacy and did nothing to avoid
unnecessary intrusion."'" The omission is surprising because this find-
ing was crucial to petitioners' argument.145 In essence, petitioners con-
tended that it would be idle for a court to consider the reasonableness
of minimization until it first determines that the monitoring agents, in
fact, made at least some attempts to minimize during the course of the
wiretap.' 46 Although a court might determine in retrospect that the
monitoring agents reasonably could have intercepted all calls in their
entirety, it would be a nonsequitur to conclude from postinterception
analysis that the monitoring agents did make reasonable efforts to min-
imize; the agents could have expended no efforts at all.' 4 7 Petitioners
thus concluded that the lack of any effort to minimize never can be
reasonable-even if every intercepted call turned out to be relevant to
the authorized purpose of the wiretap' 4 -and urged acceptance of the
full and literal meaning of the district court's finding that the absence
of any effort to minimize is dispositive of the issue of whether section
2518(5) has been violated. "41
142. 436 U.S. at 142.
143. Id at 142-43. The Court found that four of the seven calls were intercepted at the very
beginning of the wiretap. Not only were these calls of relatively short duration, but two of the
four calls, as well as the three later interceptions, indicated that the mother had some knowledge
of the conspiracy. Id
144. Joint Appendix to Brief of Petitioners at 36, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
See also 436 U.S. at 144.
145. See Brief of Petitioners at 25, 27, 29-33; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 1-7.
146. 436 U.S. at 135. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 1-7.
147. The Government made the same argument to show that the interception of all calls in
their entirety does not establish that the agents made no attempt to minimize. Brief of the United
States at 36.
148. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3-7. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae at 32-38.
149. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 1-7. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae at 38-42.
Justice Brennan in dissent also relied heavily on the district court's findings, which, he asserted,
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The uncertain status of the district court's fourth finding of fact
makes it difficult to conclusively analyze the majority's reasoning. Like
the court of appeals, the majority might have regarded this finding as a
mixed conclusion of fact and law.'5 ° The Court apparently accepted
only one factual element from the district court's findings-that the
monitoring agents in Scott had intercepted all calls in their entirety
throughout the surveillance period.'' Perhaps it is this construction of
the findings that caused-or allowed-the majority to misconstrue peti-
tioner's argument and focus on whether a monitoring agent's subjective
intent is relevant to assessing compliance with the minimization re-
quirement.
Although petitioners were less than careful in their use of lan-
guage, 5 2 the essential thrust of their argument was before the Court:
"Petitioners do not allege the agents were predisposed or intended to
violate the statute, but rather that no effort was made to comply with its
minimization requirements."' 53 Regardless of whether the correct
standard for evaluating minimization is solely objective or includes
subjective considerations, the total absence of efforts to minimize does
"were not challenged here or in the Court of Appeals." 436 U.S. at 144. But see note 132 supra.
See also notes 156-58 infra and accompanying text.
Lower courts also read Scott to mean that the monitoring agents made no attempt to minimize.
See, e.g.. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
150. See note 132 supra.
151. See notes 155-58 infra and accompanying text.
The majority's only reference to the monitoring agents' efforts to minimize is, at best, cryptic:
[Petitioners] urge that it is only after an assessment is made of the agents' good-faith
efforts, and presumably a determination that the agents did make such efforts, that one
turns to the question of whether those efforts were reasonable under the circum-
stances.. . . Thus, argue petitioners, Agent Couper's testimony, which is basically a
concession that the Government made no efforts which resulted in the noninterception of
any call, is dispositive of the matter.
436 U.S. at 135 (citation omitted). See also id at 133 n.7. The Government contended in its brief
that Agent Cooper's testimony, when read in the context of the entire transcript, meant only that
all calls were intercepted rather than that no efforts had been made to minimize. Brief of the
United States at 35-38. In response, petitioners asserted that the district court found the monitor-
ing agents' failure "to be more than just a matter of recording all calls." Reply Brief of Petitioners
at I & n.l.
152. See Brief of Petitioners at 23 (the intentions of the monitoring agents must be considered
in testing compliance with § 2518(5)); Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3 n.4 ("[A] correct analysis
requires subjective inquiry into what the agents reasonably believed and how they acted on their
reasonable beliefs."). Petitioners also did not carefully respect the distinction between search and
seizure law and tort law on the meaning of "subjective." Id
153. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 6.
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not permit the conclusion that the agents "conducted [the wiretap] in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception." '54 Petitioners' unfortunate choice of
language, however, focused the majority's attention on a red herring.
Use of the term good faith diverted the majority's attention away from
the real issue-whether the absence of any effort to minimize necessar-
ily violates the minimization provision or the fourth amendment-to
the question of whether a monitoring agent's subjective intent or good
faith is relevant to the determination. As the majority itself stated, the
word "conducted" refers to the agents' actions, not motives.155
If, indeed, the Court accepted the district court's finding that the
monitoring agents in Scott made no effort to comply with the minimi-
zation order, it has created a loophole in the statute; a reviewing court
could determine that the interception of all calls in their entirety was
reasonable, even though the monitoring agents conducted the wiretap
with no effort whatsoever to minimize.15 6 The majority, however, indi-
cated that total interception, even at the outset of the surveillance pe-
riod, would be reasonable only in some circumstances. 57 Further, the
elimination of subjective considerations from the standard of review
for minimization does not compel the conclusion that monitoring
agents need make no efforts to minimize. Minimization is an action,
not an intention. A court, therefore, need not depart from a standard
of objective reasonableness to find that monitoring agents did act to
minimize. That Scott can be read to cast doubt on the necessity for
courts to make a finding of minimization before accepting into evi-
dence intercepted conversations stems largely from the majority's fail-
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976).
155. 436 U.S. at 139.
156. Justice Brennan, in dissent, read the majority opinion as creating this loophold. In his
view, the majority would permit a "post hoc reconstruction offered by the Government of what
would have been reasonable assumptions on the part of the agents had they attempted to comply
with the statute" to establish the reasonableness of the agents' actions regardless of whether they
at all attempted to minimize. 436 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Brief of Petitioners at 19-29; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 1-7; 53 TUL. L. REv. 264, 270-71
(1978).
157. 436 U.S. at 141.
During the early stages of surveillance the agents may befarced to intercept all calls to
establish categories ofnonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter. Inter-
ception of those same types of calls might be unreasonable later on, however, once the
nonpertinent categories have been established ....
Id (emphasis added).
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ure to address explicitly the district court's fourth finding of fact.'58
Nevertheless, the Court's failure to address adequately this finding
gives rise to another troublesome concern about the majority's opinion.
The objective reasonableness standard in fourth amendment doctrine
operates, in part, to guide law enforcement officials in the execution of
searches and seizures. Because the lawfulness of a search or seizure is
measured in terms of facts and circumstances, the objective standard
outlines the type of situation in which an agent may act lawfully. 5 9
Thus in Terry v. Ohio,6 the Court not only articulated the standard of
review to be employed by courts in evaluating the legality of a stop and
frisk, but also informed police officers that they must have some combi-
nation of facts and circumstances rising to the level of reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion before they may legitimately conduct a stop and
frisk.' 6 ' Although the Court obviously could not provide rigid, univer-
sally applicable rules, its articulation of the objective standard does act
to guide and limit the officer in the field and thus performs an impor-
tant prophylactic function. 162 The covert nature of electronic surveil-
lance and the cumulative discretion exercised by monitoring agents in
its execution magnify the need for the type of general ground rules that
a standard of objective reasonableness can provide.163 In Scott, how-
158. Because Justice Brennan in dissent clearly regarded the district court's findings as unchal-
lenged, 436 U.S. at 144, it is difficult to understand why the majority did not use the opportunity
to respond to this point. In addition, petitioners conceded that the court of appeals had over-
turned the district court's findings, but argued that the court of appeals erred in this regard absent
a finding that the district court was clearly erroneous. Brief of Petitioners at 27.
159. The Court recently reaffirmed the illegality of seizures made by government agents who
lack an objectively reasonable basis of facts and circumstances to conduct the search. See Brown
v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
160. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
161. Id See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
162. The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the general remedy for fourth amendment
and Title III violations, also performs this prophylactic function. See United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 52, at 17-20.
163. In addition, the need for prophylactic guidelines in electronic surveillance exists because
"the cases show a strong inclination [on the part of the courts] to find pertinent any conversation
that has any conceivable connection to the investigation, no matter how remote." Comment, Post-
Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization, .4mendment, Sealing, and Inven-
tories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92, 108-09 (1975). As summarized for the National Wiretapping
Commission:
Minimization arguments have not met with great success. Courts have generally gone
far to accommodate the perspective of the monitoring officer during the tap and the
reasonableness of the perceived need to overhear communications in much the same way
that courts have given great weight to the claimed need of law enforcement authorities to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ever, the Court failed to avail itself of the opportunity to utilize the
prophylactic aspect of the objective reasonableness standard. 64 The
Court, by characterizing the issue in Scott as the role of good faith in
the minimization standard, left unclear whether monitoring agents
must manifest some effort at minimization even if the interception of
all calls in their entirety is "reasonable" under the circumstances, how-
ever defined.
Had the majority examined the differences between conventional
search and seizure and electronic surveillance, 65 the importance of
clarifying the requirements of section 2518(5) would have been more
apparent. In either form, a government officer may inadvertently or
improperly seize items not specified in the warrant, but in the conven-
tional search, proper particularization of the items to be seized 166 and
the tangible, recognizable nature of those items reduces both the mar-
gin for error and the officer's discretion. The execution of a wiretap
order is much less certain. Nonpertinent conversations inevitably will
be intercepted, 67 and plainly, particularization of the type of conversa-
tion to be seized through a wiretap is far more difficult than particulari-
zation of tangible items to be seized during a conventional search.
Recognition of nonpertinent conversations during the course of a wire-
tap makes the task of seizing only those items named in the warrant
even more difficult. 168 Moreover, execution of a warrant is, in a sense,
only a "single" intrusion into a person's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but the execution of a wiretap entails an invasion of privacy each
time a conversation is intercepted. Nor can an improperly seized con-
resort to wire interception as opposed to normal investigative techniques in the first
place.
Zuckerman & Lyons, Strategy and Tactics in the Prosecution and Defense of Complex Wre-In-
teception Cases, in COMMISSION STUDIES, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR TIlE REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 49 (1976).
The danger posed by this phenomenon, and thus the particular need for prophylactic rules in the
use of electronic surveillance, is described by Professor Amsterdam in his discussion of police
discretion under the fourth amendment:
What it means in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts
defer to the police. . . . If there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he
may and may not do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable.
Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 (1974).
164. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
166. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
167. See 70 supra and accompanying text.
168. Id
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versation be restored to the exclusive domain of its participants as can
an improperly seized tangible item be returned to its owner.169
These differences enhance the need in electronic surveillance for pro-
phylactic rules to perform the dual function of guiding the conduct of
monitoring agents and limiting the intrusion into reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy. Such rules would be entirely consistent with the pur-
pose of Title 111.170 Had the Court responded to petitioners' argument
that section 2518(5) requires the demonstration of some effort to mini-
mize prior to an evaluation of the reasonableness of the interceptions,
prophylactic standards might have emerged.'17  Instead, the majority
contented itself with disposing of the specter of "good faith."
Unquestionably, the Court correctly rejected any attempt to intro-
duce subjective considerations into the analysis of minimization.
Given the multiplicity of occasions in which monitoring agents must
exercise discretion and the typical need for several monitoring agents to
execute a wiretap, judicial inquiry into subjective intent could lead to a
hopeless tangle. 72 The Scott Court, however, had only to look outside
fourth amendment doctrine to its own imposition of prophylactic
guidelines in Miranda v. Arizona 73 to demonstrate the irrelevance of
169. As stated by one court, "A conversation once seized can never truly be given back as can
a physical object. The right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment has been more in-
vaded where a conversation which can never be returned has been seized." United States v. Fo-
carile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1047 (D. Md.), afidsub non United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522
(4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
170. "Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communica-
tions, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2153.
171. C. FISHMAN, supra note 67, at 232-40, proposes a set of instructions that detail procedures
by which monitoring agents should conduct wiretaps. Although the Court need not have promul-
gated such detailed guidelines, Fishman demonstrates that workable rules can be devised without
unduly hampering law enforcement.
172. See Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting from dismis-
sal of certiorari as improvidently granted):
We might wish that policemen would not act with impure plots in mind, but I do not
believe that wish a sufficient basis for excluding, in the supposed service of the Fourth
Amendment, probative evidence obtained by actions-if not thoughts-entirely in ac-
cord with the Fourth Amendment and all other constitutional requirements. In addition,
sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would
produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.
Id See also Brief of the United States at 30, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
173. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). To protect fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination and
sixth amendment rights to counsel, the Court established a set of prophylactic warnings to be
given all persons prior to custodial interrogation. Id at 467-79.
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subjective intent. Because inquiry into the subjective intent or good
faith of police officers is not necessary to establish a violation of a per-
son's Miranda rights,'74 the Court could have announced prophylactic
guidelines for the conduct of minimization without compromising its
insistence on a standard of objective reasonableness.' 71
IV. CONCLUSION: MINIMIZATION POST- SCO'
Two conclusions clearly emerge from Scott: first, the standard of
reasonableness by which to measure compliance with section 2518(5)
incorporates only the facts and circumstances known to monitoring
agents at the time of the surveillance, not the agents' subjective intent
or good faith; 76 second, the objective factor analysis employed by the
lower courts prior to Scott is the correct approach to determining
whether monitoring agents have complied with the minimization re-
quirement. 177
Unfortunately, a troubling uncertainty also emerges. The Scott
Court's failure to address explicitly the district court's findings of fact
leaves open the possibility that courts will find reasonable the intercep-
tion of all calls in cases in which monitoring agents utterly fail to at-
tempt minimization. 78 That the lower court decisions in Scott have
been read to mean that the monitoring agents made no attempts to
inimize t79 enhances the likelihood that this is how the Court's opin-
ion will be interpreted.
174. The Miranda Court did not absolutely require police officers to use the Court's precise
language in extending warnings, but did require the prosecution to demonstrate that the warnings
given were at least as effective as those promulgated in Miranda. Id at 467. Thus, what controls
the issue of a Miranda rights violation is the extension of warnings that conform to the letter and
spirit of Miranda, not the intentions of those who administer the warnings. See, e.g., United
States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex ret Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d
1248 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 907
(1970). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308-09 (interrogator's lack of bad faith does not
validate an involuntary confession). But see White, Police Tricker)' in Inducing Confessions,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979).
175. The "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation, in the opinion of the
Court, mandated the Miranda prophylactic rules. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
Similarly, an inherent characteristic of electronic surveillance-the inevitability that some inno-
cent conversations will be overheard-argues for prophylactic minimization standards. See note
70 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
178. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 149 supra.
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Nevertheless, the elimination of subjective considerations from the
standard of reasonableness does not mean that courts cannot first es-
tablish that monitoring agents, in fact, attempted to minimize before
they evaluate the reasonableness of those efforts. Nothing in Scott dis-
turbs those decisions that found patent violations of the minimization
requirement because of the absence of efforts to minimize. 11° An abso-
lute failure to attempt minimization would be a violation of section
2518(5) whether the proper standard includes subjective or solely ob-
jective considerations.' The Court can be faulted for incomplete
analysis, but the majority did not state that monitoring agents need
make no efforts to minimize. Still, the uncertainty generated by the
majority's reasoning is disappointing, if not threatening, to "the right
most valued by civilized men"-the right to privacy.18 2
Minimization post-Scott remains a difficult problem for both moni-
toring agents and courts. That Scott does little to alleviate this diffi-
culty does not obviate the fact that courts can effect minimization more
directly than by after-the-fact determinations of reasonableness. Au-
thorization orders can include expansive minimization guidelines and
practices rather than merely incorporate the enigmatic language of sec-
tion 2518(5).J3 More exacting judicial supervision during the surveil-
lance period also would help insure compliance with the minimization
requirement.'84 Perhaps the uncertainty arising out of Scott will
prompt courts to take these affirmative steps.
Wayne D. Struble
180. See note 107 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
182. See note 2 supra.
183. The minimization order in Scott, for example, merely recited the statutory language of
§ 2518(5). 436 U.S. at 131-32, 132 n.3.
184. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for example, now requires courts issuing
wiretap orders to include a provision that mandates periodic reports to the supervising judge.
Moreover, these reports must specifically include statements on what attempts the monitoring
agents have made to minimize. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See
text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
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